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Air Power in Interagency Operations

James S. Corum
Interagency operations have become a major feature of modern conflict. Throughout the Cold War, and especially since the terror attacks of 9/11, the United States and other Western nations have faced an array of unconventional threats and enemies that cannot be effectively countered and defeated by conventional military organisations and methods.
Air power has played a key role in fighting unconventional enemies and in supporting Western nations' own unconventional forces. However, non-conventional conflicts require organisations and doctrines that include personnel and resources outside the military forces and organisations that have evolved over the last sixty years. Interagency organisations contain a mix of civilian and military personnel who focus on a specific mission. A true interagency organisation is not just a military organisation with civilian employees, but is organised into groups and teams based on function and expertise in which personnel from military and civilian agencies are fully integrated, with civilians routinely supervising military personnel and vice-versa. Over time Western nations have developed integrated civilian-military organisations for unconventional conflict, such as the British committee system developed during the Malaya counterinsurgency effort (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) , in which military and civilian personnel working together coordinated the counterinsurgency effort with great success. However, a long evolution was required to reach an interagency system and the United States, with its large forces and resources, has been the major Western power to employ the interagency concept as a major tool on conflict. In recent years the best 2 example of using the interagency approach has been the United States' development of the Interagency Task Force, an organisation that plays a central role in current conflicts.
This chapter examines the evolution of the interagency concept in modern conflict and the role that air power has played in interagency operations. It examines the beginnings of air power operations in partnership with civilian agencies in the Cold War that set an early model for the US Air Force (USAF). The interagency concept evolved during the Vietnam War, which saw the first true interagency operations, and was revived to deal with irregular threats to the United States in the war on drugs in the 1990s. Finally, the interagency construct has become an indispensable organisation for waging modern conflict and in each step of the evolution of the concept the role of air power has expanded.
Cold War: air power support to intelligence agencies
Air Force support to intelligence operations conducting clandestine operations was the foundation of the early interagency operations. In 1943 General Eisenhower, then Supreme
Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean, directed the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) to allocate a small number of bombers and transports to support the resistance forces inside occupied Europe. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which directed support to anti-Nazi partisans mainly in France, Italy, and Yugoslavia, required aircraft that could penetrate German-controlled airspace at night and parachute agents and commando teams to work with partisan forces. At times, transport planes would land on rough, clandestine airfields behind the lines to deliver personnel, arms, and supplies. These secret operations required specially trained aircrew as well as modifications to aircraft. To fly alone and at night, and to find drop zones and clandestine airfields (usually, farm fields marked 3 with lights and small fires) required exceptional piloting and navigational skills (Moore 1992) .
From these small beginnings, the USAAF in Europe eventually fielded a specialist wing of 100 aircraft to support OSS operations behind enemy lines throughout southern and western Europe. The greatest success of the 'Carpetbagger' operations in support of the resistance forces was in supplying and supporting the French resistance in the summer of 1944. The resistance fighters were assisted by small teams of Allied officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who trained the resistance fighters and provided vital liaison.
As the Allies fought in Normandy thousands of German troops, including whole divisions, were tied up in fighting the well-supplied French resistance forces in the highlands of south central and eastern France. Resistance units also caused havoc with German road and rail communications (Moore 1992 Supporting the Tibetan guerrilla army, which grew to an 80,000-man force, required exceptionally long-range flights over some of the worst terrain in the world. The region between Thailand and Tibet was largely unmapped jungle and mountains. The area was also beset by sudden storms that hit with terrific force. Because the operation was so sensitive and secret there could be no network of emergency airfields, nor could the USAF mount a search and rescue effort if a plane went down. Of course, there were no navigation aids to help the American airmen navigate over endless jungle and then over some of the highest mountains in the world.
The Tibetan operation revolved around flying arms and supplies to the guerrillas as well as flying back to Tibet guerrillas who had undergone training in secret US military facilities outside Tibet. The initial missions to supply the Tibetans used the C-118 transport: a good plane for the time but with a relatively small payload, which limited the supplies and arms that could be flown into Tibet. In 1957 the USAF assigned some C-124 Globemaster transports to fly to Tibet and fly out Tibetans for guerrilla training. The USAF dramatically improved its ability to support the Tibetans when some of the first models of the C-130 6 transport were assigned to the special operations forces for the Tibetan mission. With the C-130 the special operations units supporting the CIA-led effort had an aircraft with the performance and payload to be truly effective.
The year 1959 saw one of the most dramatic episodes of the CIA/USAF operation when the US-trained Tibetan guerrillas (who had been flown back to Tibet after training outside the country) helped the legitimate spiritual and state leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, to escape the careful watch of the Chinese Army and make his way for hundreds of miles through tortuous mountain passes to the Indian border. The Dalai Lama was guarded by the US-trained and equipped guerrillas and he and his escort were sustained by supply drops by the C-130s that enabled his successful escape from the communists (Haas 1994: 28-31 ).
The Tibetan operation ended in May 1960 when a large force of the Chinese Army was deployed to Tibet to crush the insurgency. The Chinese pressure against the Tibetans became so overwhelming that continuing the resistance against the Chinese invaders was considered hopeless (Haas 1994: 31) . Still, for a decade the CIA/ USAF partnership played a key role in enabling the Tibetan resistance. The Tibet operation, more than any other Cold War operation, demonstrated the ability of the USAF to support the clandestine operations of the intelligence service, even under incredibly difficult conditions. Remarkably, the USAF lost no transport aircraft during the Tibetan operation. The loss of any transport would have resulted in a diplomatic incident with several countries. This amazing record is testimony to the exceptional planning and training of the small USAF special operations units.
Vietnam: the first true interagency operations
The (Hunt 1995: 252-253) . As the Viet Cong declined, the government presence in the countryside improved, as did the security and living standards of the rural population.
Creating CORDS was no easy process, and the CORDS organisation exhibited problems that would bedevil all interagency organisations that came after. In eessence,
CORDS was more of a coordination system than an independent agency, since it did not have its own resources. The State Department provided personnel and funding via its aid budget, and the military provided personnel, equipment, and funding for programs to develop the local South Vietnamese security forces. The CIA provided personnel as well. Considerable These types of operations had been conducted before, but usually on a limited scale.
However, the 1990s saw a series of crises erupt from Africa to Latin America to Europe and each crisis required a strong military response initially, with a strong follow-on response from civilian agencies to stabilise the country affected and assist it to restore services and government functions. In most cases these interventions required first dealing with large numbers of refugees and whole communities in dire need of medical aid and food. In the 1990s both the US-led interventions in Panama (1990) and Haiti (1995) , and the NATO-led interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) , required the deployment of significant numbers of military personnel, accompanied by aid workers and civilian agencies from supporting governments, or put under contract by the United States and NATO. The interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo required long periods to stabilise the chaotic and lawless conditions and to assist the local populations to return to a stable civilian life.
Neither the United States nor the European nations had an effective interagency doctrine or organisation to provide the command and control for military and civilian government agencies to operate together. The lack of a military/civilian command and control system meant that various ad hoc systems were thrown together that, frankly, did not work effectively. In the case of the US interventions in Panama and Haiti the US State Department, which oversees aid to foreign nations as well as law enforcement training missions, was completely unprepared to support the oversight and training of local law enforcement, was unready to assist in the rebuilding of government and other nation-building measures. The immediate distribution of food and provision of emergency health care was successful, but the long-term stability operations remained a problem (Pope 2014: 79-81) .
Part of the problem was rivalry and competition between agencies, exacerbated by insufficient planning and resources for sustained aid to government.
As in the early years of the war on drugs, it was often unclear who was actually in charge. The National Security Council, charged with ensuring that military and civilian agencies are coordinated at the strategic level, failed to work out any effective command and control for military and civilian agencies (Pope 2014: 57) . Unfortunately, the later military/civilian stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were still carried out with an ad hoc command and control system as multiple agencies led separate efforts with little overall coordination (Pope 2014: 84, 90) . Two groups emerged and climbed into two vehicles which took off in different directions. Helicopter-borne Special Forces teams intercepted one vehicle and captured the drivers, but they were low level operatives. The other vehicle with the mullah/advisor took a side road to an isolated farm compound. Knowing that this was al-Zarqawi's headquarters and as it was nearing dusk, and would have required a large force to properly surround the compound at night, the decision was made to call in an F-16 air strike, which pulverised the farm house with two 500lb precision bombs. A Special Forces team arrived minutes later to find al Zarqawi dying as well as a trove of documents in the compound. The loss of al Qaeda's charismatic leader was a major blow to the foreign jihadi forces operating in Iraq.
The strike on al Zarqawi showed how the JIATF, which fully integrated intelligence with operations and had the right mix of air assets available, could put a complex operation together with no notice and rapidly adjust the mission to achieve full success (McChrystal 2015: 130-131, 235-242) . No other kind of organisation can employ this kind of flexibility and integrate air power so efficiently into operations.
Conclusion
Interagency operations have become one of the major tools in modern conflicts with irregular enemies. The interagency organisation has proven its worth as a means of effective command and control for air, ground and sea assets. Western nations will see extensive use of interagency operations in the future and air power will be a major part of these operations. 
